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Comes now Appellants Michael Landes, Sidney Seftel and Theresa
Seftel pursuant to the provisions of Rule t35, Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals and petitions the Court of Appeals for a rehearing
of the above-referenced appeal.

In support of said petition,

Appellants respectfully submit the following:

INTRODUCTION

In rendering its decision affirming the trial court's grant
of Summary Judgment, the Appellate Court acknowledged the two-step
analysis required by Rule 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter

"U.R.C.P.).

However, notwithstanding

the trial

court's failure to undertake this two-step Analysis, the Court of
Appeals concluded that, as a matter of laty, the Small Business
Administration (hereinafter SBA) was not an indispensable party and
the trial court's error was harmless.

Appellants believe that in reaching this conclusion, the
Appellate Court erred in its application of established legal
precedent to the facts presented in the record on appeal.
POINTS OF LAW AND FACTS WHICH TJHE COURT
HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
1.

The Court of Appeals failed to cbnsider or apply the

analysis mandated by Rule 19(a) U.R.C.P., ^nd did not reach the
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question of whether the SBA was a necessary party to the litigation
that could be joined.

2.

The

Court

of Appeals

overlooked

controlling

legal

precedent in ruling that a joint obligee can authorize another
party to pursue its claim.

3. The Court of Appeals misapprehended the effect of Capital
City Bank's (hereinafter "Capital") status as a holder of the
promissory note which other court's have considered irrelevant to
an action to enforce an associated contract of guaranty.

4.

The Court of Appeals has overlooked established legal

precedent regarding the enforcement of a guaranty by a party to the
guaranty who is not also a party to an associated promissory note.

5.

The Court of Appeals has overlooked the fact that the

record on appeal and all reasonable inferences from the facts
presented in that record dictate the conclusion that the SBA is a
participating lender as to ninety percent (90%) of the obligation
and has an interest in any and all claims made under the contracts
of guaranty.
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ARGUMENT
THE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO UNDERTAKE THE TWO
STEP ANALYSIS REQUIRED BY RULE 19 IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE SBA WAS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY.

While accepting Appellants' arguments concerning application
of the factors presented under Rule 19, U.R.C.P., the Appellate
Court's opinion outlines the two-step analysis mandated by that
rule.
the

That analysis begins with a determination of whether or not
absent

party

is

a

necessary

party

to

the

litigation.

Subparagraph (a) of Rule 19, requires that a party who claims an
interest in the subject matter of the actiqn must be joined as a
party to the action if that person is subject to service of process
and joinder of the party will not deprive the court of subject
matter jurisdiction.

Therefore, as a condition precedent tc any determination of
whether or not a person is "indispensable" under Rule 19(b), a
court must first determine the following:
1. Whether the party in question Iclaims an interest in
the subject matter of the action and is so situated that
disposition of the action in his absence may impair his
ability to protect that interest or create a substantial risk
of multiple or inconsistent obligations
2.
Whether such a party is subject to service of
process; and
3.
Whether joinder will deprive the court
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
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of

As the Appellate Court correctly noted, the trial court failed
to address, let alone, make a determination on any of these
factors.

More importantly, the Appellate Court in deciding that

the SBA was not an indispensable party has failed to undertake this
mandatory analysis.

From the Appellate Court's opinion, it appears that the
initial question of whether the SBA was a necessary party that
could be joined was completely overlooked.

However, from the

Appellate Court's conclusion that the SBA was not an indispensable
party, it appears that the SBA was considered by the Court of
Appeals to be a necessary party under rule 19(a) . It is clear that
the issue of a party's status as indispensable does not have to be
addressed until it is determined that the party is necessary.

The SBA's status as a necessary party is supported by the
record in this case.

Specifically, the guaranty contracts name

the SBA as a joint obligee with Capital, and as explained in the
affidavit of M.A. Allem, "SBA is a participating lender in the loan
of Capital City to Bagel Nosh to the extent of ninety percent (90%)
of the outstanding unpaid balance." Therefore, the record reflects
that the SBA has an interest in the subject matter of the action
as a joint obligee.1
x

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals recognized that as a
general contract rule, joint obligees are deemed indispensable
parties in a suit against an obligor and cites a number of cases
that support that conclusion.
As the Court explained; "joint
obligees
are
ordinarily
considered
indispensable
because
ABB/ms
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The facts which are actually supported by the record on appeal
establish that the SBA does claim an interest relating to the
subject matter of the action and dispositioh of the action in its
absence may leave Defendants subject to d substantial risk of
multiple or inconsistent obligations.2

'[o]bligors have a "right to stand upon their contract and insist
that they shall not be harassed with different actions or suits to
recover parts of one single demand."'" (Opinion, p. 8) Implicit
within these determinations are the conclusion that the joint
obligees in those cases were necessary parties.
following its determination that the SBA was not an
indispensable party because it had authorized Capital to sue upon
the note and guaranty, the Court of Appeals stated that so long as
Capital is the holder of the note, as a matter of ordinary
commercial law there is no obligation due under the note from Bagel
Nosh to the SBA and, seemingly, no underlying obligation of Bagel
Nosh which the guarantors can be said to h^ve guaranteed to the
SBA. This observation which appears to have indirectly influenced
the Court's determination that the SBA is not an indispensable
party is contrary to accepted principals if guaranty law. An
obligee's actions to enforce an absolute, unconditional guaranty
of payment is distinct from any action to enforce the related
promissory note. See United States v. McAllister, 661 F.Supp.
1175, 1177 (E.D. N.Y., 1987).
As the I Court explained in
McAllister, "this suit (to enforce a similar SBA guaranty) seeks
recovery under the guaranty executed by the Defendants as
individuals, not on the note executed by the corporate entity
Peconic Bay. Nothing in Defendants' agreement conditions their
liability on negotiation (to the SBA) of the note."
Id., 661
F.Supp at 1177. The Court of Appeals' dicta implies that because
the SBA may not have loaned any monies to Bagel Nosh, the SBA gave
no consideration for the guaranties and therefore cannot enforce
them. While this position ignores the sworn statement of Mr. Allem
that the SBA was a participating lender in the transaction, it also
contradicts general principal of contract law which governs the
enforcement of guaranties. See Moorcroft State Bank v. Morel, 701
P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1985). The fact of from wljom the consideration
flowed at the time the contract was executed is irrelevant to its
enforcement by a named obligee on that guaranty. See Niederer v.
Ferreira, 234 Cal. Rptr. 779, 790 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1987).
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In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that Capital
contends that the undisputed facts in the record demonstrate that
the SBA has no legal interest in the guaranties. (Opinion, p. 8)
Capital's contention is disingenuous.

As the Court is aware from

oral argument, subsequent to the trial court's entry of summary
judgment, the SBA assigned its interest in the guaranties to
Capital. Obviously in making this assignment, the SBA and Capital
acknowledged its interest in the guarantees.

In addition, there

is nothing in the record which would support this

"no legal

interest" argument.

The Court of Appeals also noted in its opinion that Capital
argued on appeal that the SBA was not a party to the underlying
note and had not funded any portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh,
(Opinion, p. 2) Again, there is nothing in the record to support
the naked argument of counsel that the SBA had not funded any
portion of the loan to Bagel Nosh.3

In direct contradiction to

these contentions, at paragraph 3 of its Answer and Counterclaim,
Capital states:
"The Small Business Administration (hereinafter "SBA"), an
agency of the United States of America, has an interest in the
note and pursuant to Federal Law authorized Capital City to
enter into the transaction with Bagel Nosh."

3

In should be remembered that arguments of counsel do not
establish facts upon which summary judgment can be granted. See
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 609 F.Supp. 1174,
1185 (D.C. 111. 1985).
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Finally, the Court stated that Capital claims that the SBA has
given Capital written authorization to s^e on the guaranties.
(Opinion, p. 8) Mr. Allem's affidavit did establish that the SBA
had given Capital written authorization to sue upon the note and
guarantees.

However, that is the only fact that is supported by

the record on appeal and the only reasonable inference that can be
drawn from that fact is that the SBA claims an interest in the
litigation.4

This

interest

is such

th^t

it may

leave the

Defendants' subject to substantial risk of incurring double or
inconstant obligations.

Therefore, from the actual facts presented in the record on
appeal, the inescapable conclusion is thdit the SBA should be
considered as claiming the type of interest butlined in Rule 19(a)
U.R.C.P..

Based on this record, the other factors presented in

Rule 19(a), to wit, whether the SBA is subject to service of
process or whether joinder would defeat th& jurisdiction of the
court should have been analyzed by the trial court. This analysis
did not take place.

If the appropriate procedure is followed, it may result in
the

joinder of

the SBA as a necessary

4

party prior to any

In reviewing the granting of summary judgment the Court of
Appeals must view the facts and all reasonably inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the party contesting the motion.
Brav Lines Inc. v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 739 P.2d 115 (Utah App.
1987).
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determination of whether or not the SBA was indispensable. Failure
to

undertake

this

analysis

constitutes

reversible

error

and

requires the Court to reconsider its decision.5
THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE SBA IS NOT AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY BECAUSE IT AUTHORIZED
CAPITAL TO SUE UPON THE NOTE AND GUARANTY
IS CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING LEGAL PRECEDENT
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that Mr. Allem's
affidavit established

that the SBA had given Capital written

authorization to sue upon the note and guarantees "and thus, based
on the undisputed facts before us is not an indispensable party."
(Opinion, p. 8)

Again,

it should

be

noted

that

Capital's

counterclaim sought enforcement of the guaranty contracts not the
note and any reference to the note is irrelevant.

See United

States v. McAllister, 661 F.Supp. at 1177.

As discussed above, the only fact relied upon by Capital which
was established by the record on appeal was the existence of this
written authorization.

None of Capital City's other contentions

mentioned in the opinion are supported by either Mr. Allem's
affidavit or the record on appeal.

^hile implicitly acknowledging that the SBA was a necessary
party, the Court of Appeals has failed to recognize the impact of
that conclusion. Instead, this Court seems to have assumed facts
that are not supported by the record, to wit, that the SBA is not
subject to service of process or its joinder will defeat the
jurisdiction of the court below.
Those conclusions are not
supported by the record and therefore can not be relied upon by the
Court of Appeals in rendering its decision.
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Thus, the sole basis for the Court's conclusion that the SBA
is notf as a matter of law, an indispensable party is the existence
of this written authorization.6

What the Cburt is saying in this

decision is that a joint obligee on a contract may authorize
another obligee to pursue enforcement of the entire obligation
created by the contract and thereby avoid tl}e operation of Rule 19
and Rule 17, U.R.C.P.. This conclusion is contrary to fundamental
principals of joinder and should be recons4dered by the Court of
Appeals.

It is a basic principal of law thajt an action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. As the Utah
Supreme Court explained in Shurtleff v. Javi Tuff & Co., 622 P.2d
1168, 1172 (Utah 1980):
A defendant has the right to have a cause of action prosecuted
by the real party in interest to avoid further action on the
same demand by another and to permit tfye Defendant to assert
all defenses or counterclaims against the real owner of the
cause.
This right is not limited to original plaintiffs but must also
be satisfied for purposes of asserting a counterclaim.

First Sec.

Bank of Glendive v. Gary, 718 P.2d 1345, 134[7 (Mont. 1986).

6

It should be noted that this authorization was not an
assignment of the claim of the SBA's interest in the contract of
guaranty. As the Court is aware, such an assignment was made after
the judgment was entered.
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As joint obligees, Capital and the SBA acted as defacto
partners in relation to the transaction in question.

Again, the

record created by Mr. Allem's affidavit provides that the SBA was
a participating lender in the loan of Capital to Bagel Nosh to the
extent of ninety percent (90%) of the outstanding unpaid balance.

The Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized that courts
universally hold that an individual partner may not sue in his
own name to enforce a liability owed to a partnership.
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984)

Kemp v.

As the Utah Supreme Court

stated in Kemp:
"One partner's failure to join all partners as plaintiffs
is ground for dismissal for lack of necessary parties."
(citing Rule 19(a) U.R.C.P.) Id. 680 P.2d at 759.
In is clear in the present case that Capital is attempting to
enforce claims held by itself and the SBA in its counterclaim
against the Appellants.

In fact the written authorization relied

upon by the Court of Appeals in concluding that the SBA was not an
indispensable party, evidences the fact that Capital was enforcing
not only its claim but the claim of the SBA under the contracts of
guaranty against Appellants. In essence the written authorization
establishes that Capital was acting as the SBA's agent in enforcing
the claims of the defacto partnership.

It is well established that Appellants have a statutory right
ABB/ms

10

to have all claims enforced against them ih the name of the real
party in interest.

See Shurtleff v. Jay Tiift & Co., 622 P.2d at

Yet, the Court's present opinion ijgnores that right and

1172.

holds that by written authorization a claimant may empower its
partner or agent to enforce their joint claims and therefore avoid
being joined in the action or considered an indispensable party if
joinder

is

unavailable.

Such

a conclusion

lies

in direct

contradiction to the requirements of Rule 19 and Rule 17 and the
basic protections embodied therein and establishes an unwarranted
precedent.7
CONCLUSION
In

reaching

the conclusion

that

tt^e SBA

was

not

an

indispensable party, as a matter of law, th^ Court of Appeals was
required to determine that the SBA was a necessary party under Rule
19(a), U.R.C.P..

Such a determination requires the Court remand

the matter back to the District Court for analysis of the possible
joinder of that party. The Court of Appeal's decision that a joint
obligee may authorize another party to enforce its claims against
mutual obligors contradicts establish rules of joinder and legal

As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Kemp v. Murray, 680
P.2d at 760; "Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect the same
interests: judicial economy and fairness to the parties in
litigation...Rule 19(a) protects the interests of parties who are
present by precluding multiple litigation and contradictory claims
over the same subject matter as the original litigation. Rule
17(a) serves essentially the same policy by rbouiring an action be
brought by the real party in interest."
ABB/ms

11

precedent issued by the Utah Supreme Court• That conclusion should
be

reconsidered

by

this

Court

in

light

of

the

conflicting

precedent•

Dated this ^ ^ day of January, 1989.

^^^t^A—^t*
Daniel W. Jackson

CERTIFICATE
Daniel W. Jackson, attorney of record for appellants Michael
Landes, Sidney Seftel and Theresa Seftel hereby certifies that the
Petition for Rehearing filed in the above-referenced matter on this
26th day of January, 1989, is presented in good faith and not for
purposes of delay.
Dated this ^^^day of January, 1989.

^fe^^^£:

Daniel W. Jackson
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delivered a true and correct copy of th^ foregoing document,
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Waterman
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Main Street, Suite 1200
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David M. Connors
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Suite 1000 Kearns Bldg.
136 South Main Street
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The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
Third District Court
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
R. Kimball Mossier, Trustee
Judge Building, Suite 520
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